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The Cape Town Convention and the Law of Outer 
Space: Five Scenarios 
Mark J. Sundahl* 
The adoption of the Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention marked a new era in the evolution of the law of 
outer space by providing the first space treaty regarding private international law. This Protocol was not created in a legal 
vacuum, but was drefted against the background of the existing United Nations space treaties that were drafted in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Although the existing UN treaties address public international law and therefore cover subject matter that is 
quite distinct from the private law issues addressed by the Space Assets Protocol, there are still points at which the Protocol 
intersects with the existing treaties. This article explores these intersections, and even potential conflicts, between the Protocol 
and the existing treaties. Five hypothetical scenarios are presented to illustrate these intersections between the new and old 
laws and suggestions are made for how existing space law may either interfere with the operation of the Protocol or, in some 
cases,facilitate its operation. 
The Cape Town Convention (together with 
its Space Assets Protocol) has ushered in a 
new era of international space law as the first 
international treaty that addresses private law, 
that is, the rights and obligations of parties 
engaged m business transactions. 1 Earlier 
international space law applies to commercial 
space activity in certain respects, but the rights 
and obligations apply only to states. For example, 
a state has the duty to supervise the commercial 
space activities of its nationals. Similarly, the 
' Professor and Associate Dean for Administration, 
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law. I would like to recognize Paul Larsen's 
significant work on this subject which proved to be of 
immense help as I wrote this article. 
1 Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment, 16 November 2001, Senate Treaty Doc No 
108-10, <www.unidroit.org/ english/ conventions/ c-
main. ht;;;>(C~p~-- T~~;;-·c:;;;;;~;;;r~;;); --p;:~;;;zcl't~ 
t~·c·~;:;;~;,tion on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, in Final 
Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of 
the Draft Protocol to the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific 
UNIDROIT Doc DCME-SP-Doc. 
duty of states to return to the launching state 
errant spacecraft that have crashed in their 
territory extends to the return of privately 
owned spacecraft. However, a private company 
has no standing under international law to 
demand the return of its errant spacecraft. In 
contrast, a bank that has an international interest 
in the form of a security interest in a satellite 
has a right to exercise remedies under the Cape 
Town Convention if the debtor defaults on its 
payment obligations - because a state that is a 
party to the Convention is required to enforce 
the bank's right to exercise these remedies. 
The Cape Town Convention also differs 
from the earlier space treaties in the nature of 
the concerns that motivated its creation. In 
contrast to the earlier treaties, the Cape Town 
Convention is motivated by the concerns that 
arise from private transactions rather than 
governmental interests.2 Rather than being 
2 See PB Larsen, 'Critical Issues in the UNIDROIT 
Draft Space Protocol' in Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2003) 2, 4 (explaining 
that' [t]he Protocol is concerned primarily with private 
law and with the protections of financiers who enter 
into private law contracts, whereas existing space law is 
primarily public law.'). 
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driven by concerns of sovereignty claims and 
militarization, the Cape Town Convention 
addresses the needs of private financiers, 
such as the priority of secured parties, title to 
purchased assets, and remedies upon default. 
This stark difference in the subject matter of 
the Convention in contrast to the existing space 
treaties results for the most part in an absence of 
intersection and conflict between the treaties. 3 
Nevertheless, some intersections do arise and 
must be kept in mind by practitioners and 
courts that are involved in the application of 
the Convention. The need for this vigilance is 
heightened by the fact that the Convention and 
Protocol are, by their own terms,subordinated to 
the terms of the existing space treaties. In light 
of this, the practitioner involved in a transaction 
governed by the Cape Town Convention must 
understand not only the Convention and 
Protocol, but also the broader body of space 
law. This article explores five hypothetical 
scenarios that illustrate potential intersections 
and conflicts between the Convention and the 
existing law of outer space. 
I. A Concise Introduction to the Law of 
Outer Space 
The codification of space law began with the 
1962 United Nations Declaration ef Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities ef States in the Exploration 
3 P van Fenema, 'The UNIDROIT Space Protocol, 
the Concept of 'Launching State', Space Traffic 
Management and the Delimination of Outer Space 
(Report of the 41st Session of the UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee)' (2002) 27 Air & Space L 266, 
275 (explaining that during a meeting in 1997 the 
UNIDROIT Space Working Group 'concluded that 
there was no conflict between the provisions of the 
draft Protocol and the existing body of space law' and 
that the ITU indicated 'that it saw neither overlap nor 
contradiction between the [Cape Town] Convention 
and the draft Protocol, on the one hand, and the ITU 
Constitution, Convention and Radio Regulations, 
on the other.'); PB Larsen (n 2) 3 (explaining that the 
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee 'agreed with the no 
conflicts principle' recognized by the Space Working 
Group). For the views of the UNCOPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee see UN Committee of Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on 
its forty-first session, UN Doc Al AC.105/787 (2002). 
and Use ef Outer Space. 4 This Declaration in-
cluded the following fundamental principles that 
formed the bedrock of international space law: 
• That space should be explored and used for 
the benefit of all mankind;5 
• That space is open to free exploration by 
all states;6 
• That no state can claim sovereignty over 
space or celestial bodies; 7 
• That space should be used in accordance 
with international law and in the interests 
of peace;8 
• That states must bear responsibility for 
their activity in space, supervise activities of 
non-governmental parties, and be liable for 
harm caused by their activity or by their 
nationals; 9 
• That states maintain a registry of their space 
objects; 10 
• That space activity be guided by 
international cooperation and that states 
avoid interference with the activities of 
other states; 11 
• That the state of registry maintain jurisdic-
tion and control over a space object; 12 
• That ownership shall not be affected by an 
object's entry into space; 13 
• That states provide assistance to astronauts 
in distress; 14 and 
• That states return to the launching state any 
astronauts or space objects found on their 
territory or on the high seas. 15 
4 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, UNGA Res 1962, 1280th plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/1962 (13 December 1963) (Declaration of 
Principles). 
5 Ibid para 1. 
6 Ibid para 2. 
7 Ibid para 3. 
8 Ibid para 4. 
9 Ibid paras 5 & 8. 
10 Ibid para 7. 
11 Ibid para 6. 
12 Ibid para 7. 
13 Ibid para 7. 
14 Ibid para 2. 
15 Ibid paras 7 & 9. 
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These principles reflect the issues and concerns 
that existed at the time of drafting. Space 
activity was limited to governments and the 
prospect of private commercial space use was 
a rather distant concept. The concerns of the 
United States and the Soviet Union were of 
a governmental nature, namely, to prevent the 
appropriation of space by the other state, to 
avoid the militarization of space, to maintain 
control over their satellites, and to ensure 
the rescue and return of their astronauts and 
spacecraft. 
In the years following the adoption of the 
Declaration of Legal Principles, five treaties 
were drafted under the auspices of the United 
Nations to codify and elaborate upon the 
principles contained in the Declaration. These 
five core space treaties include: 
• The Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space 
Treaty); 16 
• The Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into 
Space (Rescue and Return Agreement); 17 
• The Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
(Liability Convention); 18 
• The Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (Registration 
Convention); 19 and 
16 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 
October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty). 
17 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Space (adopted 22 April 1968, entered 
into force 3 December 1968) 672 UNTS 119 (Rescue 
and Return Agreement). 
18 Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (adopted 29 March 1972, 
entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187 
(Liability Convention). 
19 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (adopted 14 January 1975, entered 
• The Agreement Governing Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (Moon Agreement). 20 
All of these treaties have entered into force and 
have been broadly ratified, with the exception 
of the Moon Agreement which, although it 
received a sufficient number of ratifications 
to enter into force, has been ratified by only 
thirteen states (none of which are space 
powers). 21 One additional area of international 
law that could be implicated by the operation of 
the Cape Town Convention is the international 
law governing telecommunications. This area 
of the law regulates the allocation of orbital 
slots for telecommunications satellites and the 
use of radio frequencies. This law is overseen 
by the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) and the governing documents 
include the Constitution of the International 
Telecommunications Union, the Convention ef the 
International Telecommunication Union, and the 
ITU Radio Regulations. 22 Although there are 
potential intersections between the Cape Town 
Convention and ITU instruments, this article 
will only consider the five UN space treaties. 
The relationship between the Convention and 
customary international law regarding outer 
space activities also falls outside the scope of 
this article. 
The following sections will examine how 
the Cape Town Convention interacts with 
space law through five illustrative examples. 
into force 15 September 1976) 1023 UNTS 15 
(Registration Convention). 
20 Agreement Governing Activities of States on 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 
UNTS 3 (Moon Agreement). 
21 Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space, Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, 6 June 2011, UN Doc Al 
AC.105/2011/CRP 12. 
22 Constitution of the International 
Telecommunications Union <http:/ /www.itu. 
int/aboutitu/basic-texts/ constituti~~htrul>~·(ITU 
ConvE,ntt on-~-~f~-a;_;;~T;t-;;:national 
Telecommunication Union <http:/ I ~~~21::?:. 
int/ aboutitu/basic-texts/ convention.html> (ITU 
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However, before taking up these particular 
points of intersection between existing space 
law and the Cape Town Convention, the next 
section discusses the preliminary issue regarding 
how conflicts between the Convention and 
other sources of space law should be resolved. 
II. The Relationship between the Cape 
Town Convention and the UN Treaties 
The effect of the Cape Town Convention 
on the existing law of outer space was of 
critical concern to members of the Space 
Assets Working Group during the drafting 
of the Space Assets Protocol. As mentioned 
above, there was concern among governments 
and academics that the Space Assets Protocol 
would inadvertently upset the existing system 
of international space law. For example, there 
was concern that the registry of international 
interests would somehow conflict with the 
existing register of space objects maintained 
by the United Nations and negatively affect 
the legal implications of the UN register. To 
resolve these concerns the Working Group 
addressed the relationship of existing space 
law to the Convention in two ways in the 
Protocol. First, the fourth recital in the 
preamble to the Protocol recognizes the 
importance of preserving the principles of 
space law:23 
MINDFUL of the established principles of 
space law, including those contained in the 
international space treaties of the United 
Nations and the instruments of the International 
Telecommunication Union ... 
Although the language of a treaty preamble 
is not binding, it does help to define the 
context of the treaty which, under the Vienna 
Convention, must be taken into account when 
interpreting the treaty. The word 'mindful' is 
not particularly reassuring to those who might 
wish for a stronger statement of the absolute 
primacy of existing space law. But the word 
means at a minimum that the drafters were 
aware of the importance of existing space 
law - and perhaps that the treaty should be 
23 Space Assets Protocol Preamble Fourth Recital. 
interpreted to the extent possible in a manner 
that is consistent with existing space law. 
Second, Article XXXV of the Protocol, 
reproduced here, explicitly 
the primacy of the UN treaties 
instruments over the Convention:24 
establishes 
and ITU 
The Convention as applied to space assets does 
not affect State Party rights and obligations 
under the existing United Nations outer space 
treaties or instruments of the International 
Telecommunication Union. 
This provision is binding on the parties to 
the Protocol and establishes the primacy 
of the five United Nations treaties and the 
ITU instruments over the provisions of the 
Convention. Unlike the fourth recital of the 
preamble, only the United Nations treaties 
and ITU instruments are mentioned in this 
article, thus leaving any conflicts between the 
Convention and other sources of international 
space law to be resolved according to the 
principles of lex posterior and lex specialis (which 
would almost certainly give primacy to the 
Convention and Protocol). This means that 
there is at least the potential that some areas of 
space law will be trumped by the Convention 
and Protocol. If customary international law or 
treaties concluded by states outside the auspices 
of the United Nations or the ITU conflict with 
the Convention, primacy will likely be given to 
the Convention. 
III. The Five Scenarios 
The following five hypothetical scenarios 
illustrate situations in which the Cape Town 
Convention and Space Assets Protocol intersect 
with the UN space treaties and identify legal 
interactions that can affect the operation 
of the Convention (and in some cases the 
operation of the UN treaties). These situations 
arise with respect to (i) the operation of the 
Liability Convention, (ii) the operation of the 
Rescue and Return Agreement, and (iii) the 
jurisdictional provisions found in the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Registration Convention. 
24 Space Assets Protocol art XXXV 
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A. Scenario # 1: Liability Continues Despite 
Transfer of the Space Asset 
Bank finances the construction of a 
satellite owned by Satco and the satellite 
is launched into orbit from State X. Bank 
takes a security interest in the satellite 
which is enforceable as an 'international 
interest' under the Cape Town 
Convention. When SatCo's business fails, 
Bank enforces its international interest 
by selling the satellite to TeleSat, a state-
owned enterprise wholly owned by 
State Z. Two years later, due to State 
Z's negligence, the satellite reenters the 
atmosphere and causes extensive damage 
on the surface of the Earth. Who is liable 
for the damage? 
Under this scenario, State X will bear absolute 
liability for the damage under the Liability 
Convention. The Liability Convention imposes 
liability on the 'launching state' under two 
rubrics. Article II of the Liability Convention 
imposes strict liability on the 'launching State' 
for all damage caused by a space object on 
Earth or to aircraft in flight: 25 
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to 
pay compensation for damage caused by its space 
object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft 
in flight. 
In contrast, Article III of the Convention 
imposes liability on the launching state when a 
space object causes damage to the space object 
of another state when the object is in the air or 
in space, but only when the launching state is 
'at fault': 26 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere 
than on the surface of the Earth to a space object 
of one launching State or to persons or property 
on board such a space object by a space object of 
another launching State, the latter shall be liable 
25 Liability Convention art II. 
26 Ibid art III. Note that both Article II andArticle III 
address damage caused in airspace, with the distinction 
being that Article II governs damage caused to aircraft 
while Article III addresses damage to space objects 
(which are presumably either en route to or returning 
from space). 
only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault 
of persons for whom it is responsible. 
Under Article I of the Liability Convention, 
the definition of a 'launching State' that could 
bear liability for damage caused by a space 
object remains unchanged from the Outer 
Space Treaty and includes (1) a state which 
launches a space object, (2) a state which 
procures the launch of a space object, (3) a 
state from whose territory a space object is 
launched and (4) a state from whose facility a 
space object is launched.27 This last category 
could apply to a state that owns a launching 
facility, for example, located on an artificial 
island on the high seas. In the event that there 
are multiple launching states, each state is 
jointly and severally liable for damage caused 
by the space object. 28 This multi-faceted 
definition of a launching state together with 
the rule of joint and several liability provides 
a state that has suffered damage (or whose 
nationals have suffered damage) the possibility 
of pursuing multiple states, thus allowing for a 
greater likelihood of recovery. 29 
The paradigm for state liability for space 
activities established by the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Liability Convention has been placed 
under stress over the years by the gradual 
expansion of private commercial activity in 
space. The liability paradigm set forth in the 
treaties primarily contemplates governmental 
space activity which involves a state launching 
a satellite or spacecraft and maintaining control 
over that space object for its entire lifespan. 30 
27 Liability Convention art I. 
28 Ibid artV(1) and (3). 
29 See S Hobe, B Schmidt-Tedd and K Schrogl (eds), 
Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag 2009) 135; see also RJ Lee, 'Reconciling 
International Space Law with the Commercial Realities 
of the Twenty-First Century' (2000) 4 Singapore J Intl & 
Comparative L 194, 200-01 (explaining how there could, 
theoretically, 'be well over four launching States in any 
single launch.'). Liability also attaches if an attempted, 
but unsuccessful, launch of a space object causes harm. 
Liability Convention art I(b). 
30 Although governmental use of space was the 
primary scenario contemplated by the drafters of the 
space treaties, there was also an understanding that 
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With the advent and expansion of private 
space activity, the complexities of commercial 
transactions, including the transfer of ownership 
of a space object during its operational lifespan 
(such as on-orbit satellites), challenged the 
propriety of the existing liability paradigm. 
While these issues have existed since the 
commercialization of space began, some of the 
tensions between commercialization and the 
existing law of outer space may be exacerbated 
by the use of the Cape Town Convention. 
A widely criticized shortcoming of the 
existing law of outer space is that the launching 
state continues to be liable under the Outer 
Space Treaty and Liability Convention even 
after the transfer of the space object by the 
launching state, or by one of its nationals, to 
another state or private party (or after the state's 
loss of direct control over the object through 
other circumstances, such as the lease of an 
object). 31 The liability imposed by the treaties 
on a launching state is perpetual, with only a 
few narrow exceptions. Critics of this result see 
a fundamental unfairness in imposing liability 
on the launching state when it was in no way 
commercial activity would also take place, as is made 
clear in the Outer Space Treaty's reference in Article VI 
to space activity by 'non-governmental entities.' 
31 See, eg, FG von der Dunk, 'The Illogical Link: 
Launching, Liability and Leasing' in Proceedings of 
the Thirty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 
(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
1993) 349, 351; M Chatzipanagiotis, 'Registration of 
Space Objects and Transfer of Ownership in Orbit' 
(2007) 56 Zeitschrift fur Lu.ft- und Weltraumrecht 229, 
230; PB Larsen (n 2) 5; HR Hertzfeld and FG von 
der Dunk, 'Bringing Space Law into the Commercial 
World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty' 
(2005) 6 Chicago J Intl L 81, 89; RJ Lee, 'Effects of 
Satellite Ownership Transfers on the Liability of the 
Launching States' in Proceedings of the Forty-Third 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2001) 
148, 151; PB Larsen, 'UNIDROIT Space Protocol: 
Comments on the Relationship between the Protocol 
and Existing International Space Law' in Proceedings of 
the Forty-Fourth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 
(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
2002) 187, 190; UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.225, 23 
January 2001. 
involved in the harmful activity. This issue may 
be exacerbated by the entry of the Cape Town 
Convention into force with respect to space 
assets under the theory that the Convention 
will result in an increase in the sale and lease 
of space assets after their launch. The increase 
in sales and leases under the Convention will 
arise not only in simple sales and leases, but 
through sales and leases that take place in the 
form of remedies pursued by secured creditors. 
This increase in transactions is likely to occur 
if the Cape Town Convention is perceived as 
being useful to facilitate such transactions by 
providing rights and remedies, or other benefits, 
which were not available under pre-existing law. 
The increase in sales and leases will create more 
situations in which the launching state loses 
control over the space object (or loses control, 
by way of loss of jurisdiction, over the entity 
that controls the space object), thus making 
more distinct the disconnection between the 
existing liability regime and the realities of 
commercial space activity. In addition, the right 
of a secured creditor to repossess a space asset 
or take control of the asset upon default (in 
advance of selling or leasing the asset) will place 
additional stress on the existing liability regime 
by potentially interfering with the launching 
state's ability to control the asset even before it 
is sold or leased. For the launching state will 
potentially bear liability for any damage caused 
by the asset (and will bear absolute liability for 
any damage caused in the air or on Earth) even 
though the launching state has been deprived 
of any ability to control the asset due to secured 
creditors seizing control of the asset under the 
Cape Town Convention. 
B. Scenario #2: The Convention Assists in 
Determining Liability 
Bank finances the construction of a 
satellite owned by a secretive company, 
X Corp, and the satellite is launched into 
orbit from an unknown location under 
high secrecy.Bank takes a security interest 
in the satellite which is enforceable as an 
'international interest' under the Cape 
Town Convention. Bank registered the 
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international interest before the launch. 
The satellite fails to reach a sustainable 
orbit and causes damage in State Y after 
reentering the atmosphere and falling to 
Earth soon after launch. The launching 
state does not submit any information 
about the launch to the UN under the 
Registration Convention because the 
satellite failed to reach orbit. State Y 
is unable to determine the identity of 
the company or the launching state of 
the satellite for purposes of assigning 
liability under the Liability Convention. 
In this scenario, the registration of an 
international interest m the Cape Town 
Registry could provide information that might 
assist in the recovery of damages by the injured 
party under domestic law or under the Liability 
Convention. Provided that the identifying 
information was preserved on the remains of 
the satellite, the Cape Town Registry could be 
searched and would reveal the parties involved 
in the financing transaction. After discovering 
that Bank held an international interest in the 
satellite, the damaged party could approach 
Bank to discover the identity of the debtor who 
launched the satellite. An action could then be 
brought against the private entity that owned 
the satellite or against the launching state (if 
further inquiry revealed the place of launch). 
In a scenario such as this, the Cape Town 
Convention could have a beneficial effect 
by facilitating the operation of the liability 
provisions of the space treaties because the 
registry of international interests will (1) aid 
in the identification of space objects that have 
caused damage and (2) aid in the identification 
of entities that have actual control over space 
objects. The identification of the private party 
in control of the space asset that has caused 
harm will aid in bringing an action for damages 
against that party under applicable domestic 
law. Moreover, the registry of international 
interests may aid in identifying the state that 
bears liability under international law. 
One of the challenges of finding a state 
liable for damage caused by a space object is 
identifying the launching state. The United 
Nations register of space objects that is 
maintained pursuant to the Registration 
Convention plays a critical role in helping to 
identify launching states. The Registration 
Convention was adopted in 197 5 to establish 
a central international register of space objects 
for a variety of reasons including (1) improving 
awareness of objects in orbit, (2) establishing 
the jurisdiction and control over space objects 
by the state of registry, and (3) identifying the 
launching state of objects that cause damage. 32 
The Cape Town Convention registry of 
international interests in space assets can 
serve the same function as the UN register by 
assisting in the identification of the launching 
state or other states (or entities) that may face 
liability for damage caused by a space object.33 
But rather than merely duplicating the benefits 
of the UN register, the registry of international 
interests will supplement the UN register by 
providing information that may not be available 
through the UN register. Like the information 
collected under the Registration Convention, 
the registry of international interests will be 
available to the public online. However, the 
type of information provided on the registry 
will differ significantly from information 
found on the UN register. The registry of 
international interests will be searchable by 
asset and the records returned upon a search 
will provide the name of any parties that have 
registered or recorded any interest in the 
asset. In addition, instead of providing the 
names of the launching states, the registry of 
international interests will contain the names 
of the holders of an international interest in the 
asset or a buyer that has registered a sale. The 
registry of international interests also differs 
from the UN register in that (1) states register 
space objects in the UN register to comply 
with international law while parties register 
international interests to protect their financial 
interests and (2) states are only required to 
submit information to the UN when an 
32 Regarding the Registration Convention see 
generally, F Lyall and PB Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise 
(Ashgate 2009) 84-96. 
33 This possibility is raised in PB Larsen (n 2) 6. 
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object has reached space while holders of an 
international interest are likely to register long 
before launch. In light of these differences 
between the two registries, the Cape Town 
Convention registry could complement the 
UN register in a number of ways. 
First, a space object that is not on the UN 
register may be registered on the Cape Town 
Convention registry. If the launching state is 
not a party to the Registration Convention, 
but is involved in a transaction related to a 
space object that gives rise to a registrable 
interest under the Space Assets Protocol, there 
will likely be a registration related to the object 
on the Cape Town Convention registry. 34 
Second, a space object that causes damage 
on Earth may be easier to identify through 
information that is found on the Cape Town 
Convention registry and may not be on the 
UN register, such as a serial number. 35 The 
registry of international interests will also carry 
information about components of space objects 
(since international interests in components 
are separately registrable), which could assist 
in the identification of the space object as a 
whole. Although a search for international 
interests will only reveal the name of the buyer 
or creditor, this information can lead, through 
further inquiry, to the identity of the launching 
state or other responsible party. 
Third, the Cape Town Convention registry 
will capture transfers of ownership of space 
objects (and the transfer of control through 
leases) through the registration of sales and 
leases. This information could be useful if a 
damaged state is seeking reparations under the 
theory that the 'appropriate state' is responsible 
for the damage due to its failure to properly 
authorize or supervise the space activity that 
caused the damage. Similarly, the registration 
of sales and leases will be helpful to determine 
what party had actual control of a space object 
at the time damage occurred, which could help 
support a claim under state responsibility for its 
34 PB Larsen (n 31) 188. 
35 See, eg, ibid (explaining that the Protocol has 
more stringent identification requirements than the 
Registration Convention). 
national activities in space or under domestic 
tort laws. 
C. Scenario #3:The Rescue and Return Agreement 
Assists in the Application ef the Convention 
A reusable space capsule is launched 
from State X, which is a party to the 
Cape Town Convention, and upon 
reentry loses controls of its landing 
trajectory and unexpectedly lands in 
State Y. State Y is not a party to the Cape 
Town Convention, but is a party to the 
Rescue and Return Agreement. Bank 
financed the construction of the space 
capsule and holds a security interest 
subject to the Cape Town Convention. 
Bank wants to enforce its international 
interest and repossess the space capsule. 
In this scenario, Bank would not be able to 
proceed against the space capsule under the 
Cape Town Convention in State Y However, 
State Y would be required under the Rescue 
and Return Agreement to return the capsule to 
State X, which would then allow the creditor 
to proceed under the Cape Town Convention 
in State X to repossess the capsule and pursue 
other remedies. 
The duty to return space objects was 
originally contained in Paragraph 7 of the 1962 
Declaration of Principles and in Article VIII the 
1968 Outer Space Treaty. 36 Just one year after 
the Outer Space Treaty was completed, the 
Rescue and Return Agreement was concluded 
in order to elaborate upon the duty to rescue 
and return that had been established in the 
Outer Space Treaty. 37 The fact that this treaty 
was drafted before the drafting of the treaties 
regarding liability and registration were taken 
up reflects the importance attached by the 
United States and the Soviet Union to the 
duty to rescue astronauts and return lost space 
objects. Although the duty to rescue astronauts 
36 Declaration of Principles para 7; Outer Space 
Treaty art VIII. 
37 For a thorough discussion of the duty to rescue 
astronauts and return space objects see MJ Sundahl, 
'The Duty to Rescue Space Tourists and Return 
Private Spacecraft' (2009) 35 J Space L 163. 
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could be said to be purely humanitarian in 
spirit, the duty to return lost space objects was 
motivated by the desire to reclaim sensitive 
technology that had fallen out of the control of 
the launching state. 
Regarding the duty to return errant space 
objects, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
provides as follows: 38 
[O]bjects or component parts found beyond the 
limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry they are carried shall be returned to that 
State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return. 
Article 5 of the Rescue and Return Agreement 
requires the return of any space object to the 
state of registry whenever the object is found 
outside of that state's jurisdiction, regardless of 
the circumstances leading to the discovery of 
the object:39 
Upon request of the launching authority, objects 
launched into outer space or their component 
parts found beyond the territorial limits of the 
launching authority shall be returned to or held 
at the disposal of representatives of the launching 
authority, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return. 
The space object (or component parts) must be 
returned to the 'launching authority.' The term 
'launching authority' is defined in Article 6 of 
the Rescue and Return Agreement: 40 
For the purposes of this Agreement, the 
term 'launching authority' shall refer to the 
State responsible for launching, or, where an 
international intergovernmental organization 
is responsible for launching, that organization, 
provided that that organization declares its 
acceptance of the rights and obligations provided 
for in this Agreement and a majority of the States 
members of that organization are Contracting 
Parties to this Agreement and to the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 
In short, an errant space object must be returned 
to the state (or under the conditions stated, the 
38 Outer Space Treaty art VIII. 
39 Rescue and Return Agreement art 5(3). 
40 Ibid art 6. 
international intergovernmental organization) 
that is 'responsible for launching' the object. 
It should be kept in mind that the duties 
under the Rescue and Return Agreement, as 
well as the Outer Space Treaty, are only triggered 
with respect to those spacecraft or other space 
objects that have been 'launched into outer 
space.'41 This means that creditors cannot look 
to the Rescue and Return Agreement or Outer 
Space Treaty for assistance in recovering errant 
space assets unless the assets have been launched. 
For example, a satellite warehoused in a foreign 
state prior to launch will have to be recovered 
by the creditor without the aid of these treaties. 
In addition to the scenario set forth at the 
outset of this section, there are other potential 
situations in which the Rescue and Return 
Agreement may be implicated in a transaction 
governed by the Cape Town Convention.42 
Some of these scenarios involve the operation 
of the Rescue and Return Agreement to 
the benefit of the holder of an international 
interest, while other situations may arise in 
which the Rescue and ReturnAgreement may 
operate in a manner that would be detrimental 
to the interests of a creditor. One such scenario 
is discussed in the next section. 
D. Scenario #4: The Rescue and Return Agreement 
Inteiferes with the Application ef the Cape Town 
Convention 
A reusable space capsule is launched by 
Company from State A, which is not a 
party to the Cape Town Convention. 
On its return to Earth, the space 
capsule guidance systems malfunction 
and the capsule lands unexpectedly 
in State B, which is party to both the 
Rescue and Return Agreement and the 
Cape Town Convention. The bad press 
41 Rescue and Return Agreement Preamble First 
Recital art 5(3); Outer Space Treaty art VIII. 
42 This intersection between existing space law 
and the Cape Town Convention has been discussed 
by Larsen and Heilbock. PB Larsen and JA Heilbock, 
'UNIDROIT Project on Security Interests: How the 
Project Affects Space Objects' (1999) 64 J Air L & 
Commerce 703, 719. 
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from the emergency landing resulted 
in cancellations by future customers. 
Under financial distress from the loss 
of business, Company defaults on its 
obligations to Bank. Bank immediately 
attempts to enforce its international 
interest against the capsule under the 
Cape Town Convention by applying for 
a court order in State B to allow Bank's 
repossession of the space capsule. At the 
same time, Company seeks to avoid the 
repossession of the capsule by requesting 
that State A make a diplomatic request of 
State B to return the capsule to State A, 
which is the 'launching authority' under 
the Rescue and Return Agreement. 
In this scenario, State B's obligation under the 
Rescue and Return Agreement could lead 
to a result that is contrary to the interests of 
the creditor. Under the Rescue and Return 
Agreement, State B is required to return the 
capsule to State A, which is not a party to the 
Cape Town Convention - an action which may 
impede the exercise of the creditor's remedies 
under the Convention. 
How will the conflict between these two 
competing treaty obligations be resolved? On 
the one hand, the Cape Town Convention 
requires the courts of State B to grant Bank 
possession. On the other hand, the Rescue and 
Return Agreement requires State B to return 
the space capsule to State A. Under the Cape 
Town Convention, primacy is given to the 
Rescue and Return Agreement and the court 
may have to dismiss Bank's case requesting 
repossession. When the capsule is returned 
to State A, Bank will have no choice but to 
proceed against the capsule under the domestic 
laws of State A (which, without the benefit of 
the Cape Town Convention, may be inimical to 
its interests). 43 This obstructionist effect of the 
Rescue and Return Agreement may be sought 
43 Of course, if State A were a party to the Cape 
Town Convention and Protocol, once the asset were 
returned to State A under the Rescue and Return 
Agreement, the courts of State A would have to enforce 
the creditor's right to enforce its remedies under the 
Convention. See PB Larsen (n 31) 192. 
out by debtors who could choose to launch 
from a state that is not a party to the Cape Town 
Convention in an attempt to use the Rescue 
and Return Agreement to deprive its creditors 
from availing themselves of the remedies of 
the Cape Town Convention. It should be kept 
in mind that a state is obligated to return a 
space object to the launching authority even 
if the landing of the object is not the result of 
emergency or distress. 
The foregoing analysis may lead to a different 
result if the vehicle involved in the above 
example were a suborbital spaceplane that is 
only temporarily in space, and which would 
therefore be subject to the Aircraft Protocol 
rather than the Space Assets Protocol. Since 
the Aircraft Protocol does not give supremacy 
to the UN space treaties, any provisions in the 
Convention or Aircraft Protocol that conflicted 
with the provisions of the Rescue and Return 
Agreement would likely be resolved in favor 
of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol under 
the doctrines of lex posterior or lex specialis. If 
this were the case, then Bank in the above 
example would likely succeed in its motion 
to take possession of the spaceplane since the 
obligation of State B to grant Bank possession 
would take priority over its duty to return 
the spaceplane under the Rescue and Return 
Agreement. 
E. Scenario #5: The Jurisdictional Provisions 
of the Cape Town Conventions are Trumped by 
Jurisdictional Provisions in the Space Treaties 
Company in State A has a satellite 
launched from State B. State B registers 
the satellite under the Registration 
Convention. The satellite is controlled 
from a ground station in State A (and 
is therefore 'situated' in State A for 
purposes of seeking interim relief under 
the Cape Town Convention). A bank in 
State C financed the construction and 
launch of the satellite. The bank believes 
the company has defaulted and seeks 
interim relief from a court in State A 
to ensure that the satellite is not moved 
to a different orbit. Can Company 
1Hl Cape Town Convention Journal November 2014 
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successfully argue that the courts of 
State A have no jurisdiction over the 
satellite and must dismiss the request for 
interim relief? 
An argument could be made that the courts of 
State A have no jurisdiction and must dismiss 
the case because Article VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty grants jurisdiction over a space object to 
the state of registry:44 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an 
object launched into outer space is carried shall 
retain jurisdiction and control over such object, 
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer 
space or on a celestial body. 
Pursuant to the Registration Convention, 
when a space object is launched into space, 
the launching state is required to record the 
launch in its national registry (as well as provide 
information about the object to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to be included 
in the international register).45 It is this state of 
registry that then has 'jurisdiction and control' 
over the object under Article VIII of the Outer 
Space Treaty. Given the supremacy of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the question arises as to 
whether Article VIII affects the operation of 
the jurisdictional provisions of the Cape Town 
Convention. 
Prior to the final enforcement of a remedy 
or adjudication of a claim, a party may seek 
interim relief under Article 13 of the Cape 
Town Convention in those states that have 
jurisdiction pursuant to the agreement of 
the parties as well as in certain other states 
depending on the type of reliefbeing sought. 46 
Under Article 43, a state in which the asset is 
'situated' has jurisdiction to grant in rem relief, 
while a state where the debtor is 'situated' 
has jurisdiction to grant in personam relief. 47 
Pursuant to the Protocol, a space asset is 
44 Outer Space Treaty art VIII. 
45 Registration Convention art II(1). If there is more 
than one 'launching state', those states are to decide 
among themselves which state will be the state of 
registry (of which there can be only one). Ibid art II(2). 
46 Cape Town Convention art 13. 
47 Ibid art 43. 
'situated' in the territory of a state where 'a 
mission control centre for the space asset 1s 
located.' 48 
The question for parties engaged in a 
transaction under the Cape Town Convention, 
for lawyers who represent such parties, and for 
courts that are asked to adjudicate issues arising 
under the Convention is whether Article VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty affects the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Convention and the Protocol. 
The answer to this question depends on how 
'jurisdiction' is interpreted in the Outer Space 
Treaty - a question that has been the subject of 
considerable academic debate. 
As a preliminary matter, the nature of 
the various forms of jurisdiction must be 
considered. Jurisdiction is generally described 
as taking three basic forms of (1) prescriptive 
jurisdiction, (2) enforcement jurisdiction, and 
(3) adjudicative jurisdiction. 49 Prescriptive 
jurisdiction is the right of a state to apply its 
laws to the 'activities, relations, or status of 
persons, or the interests of persons in things.'50 
Enforcement jurisdiction refers to a state's right 
to enforce (or punish noncompliance with) its 
laws. 51 Finally, adjudicative jurisdiction is the 
right of a state's courts to subject persons or 
things to their adjudicative processes and issue a 
ruling on a matter. 52 Adjudicative jurisdiction 
can arise over persons (in personam jurisdiction) 
48 Space Assets Protocol art I(4). 
49 C Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law 
(OUP 2008) 9. See also generally, WM Reisman (ed), 
Jurisdiction in International Law (Ashgate/Dartmouth 
1999). 
5° C Ryngaert (n 49) 9 (citing Restatement (Third) 
of US. Foreign Relations Law (2014 supp, American 
Law Institute 1987) §401(a)). Under customary 
international law, a state has prescriptive jurisdiction 
if one of the bases of jurisdiction is present. The 
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction are (1) territoriality, 
(2) nationality, (3) effects, ( 4) national security, (5) 
passive personality, and (6) universality. K Raustiala, 
'The Geography of Justice' (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 
2501, 2512. While territoriality and nationality are 
widely accepted as bases of prescriptive jurisdiction 
in domestic legal systems, the other bases are accepted 
only to varying degrees. 
51 C Ryngaert (n 49) 9. 
52 Ibid 10. 
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or over property (in rem jurisdiction).53 In 
addition, jurisdiction can also be 'exclusive' or 
'concurrent.' Exclusive jurisdiction exists when 
a court has sole jurisdiction over a matter and 
no other court is able to assert its jurisdiction. 
In contrast, concurrent jurisdiction describes 
the situation where multiple courts are able to 
assert their jurisdiction over the same matter. 
One interpretation of Article VIII is that only 
the state of registry has jurisdiction of any kind 
over a space object and any judicial disputes 
regarding that space object. This would mean, 
in other words, that the state of registry has 
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the space 
object and exclusive jurisdiction to hear a 
case involving the object.54 If this approach 
is adopted, then Article VIII would trump all 
jurisdictional provisions of the Cape Town 
Convention and Protocol and would permit 
only the state of registry to issue orders regarding 
the enforcement of remedies and other matters 
arising under the Convention. This would be 
53 AT von Mehren, 'Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: 
General Theories Compared and Evaluated' (1983) 63 
Boston UL Rev 279, 286. 
54 See, eg, S Aoki, 'In Search of the Current Legal 
Status of the Registration of Space Objects' in Corinne 
M Jorgenson (ed), 2010 Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law (American Institute of Aeronautics 
2011) 245, 248 (stating that' Li]urisdiction arising from 
the registration shall be comprehensive, and a State of 
registry is supposed to hold legislative, judicial and, 
above all, enforcement jurisdiction.'). Aoki admits 
that state practice has not always observed such a 
far-reaching interpretation of the Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty, but does not think that such state 
practice affects the interpretation of the treaty See also 
M Chatzipanagiotis, The Legal Status of Space Tourists 
in the Framework of Commercial Suborbital Flights (Carl 
Heymanns Verlag 2011) 48; RJ Lee (n 31) 150-51 
(stating that 'only one state can exercise jurisdiction over 
... satellites.'); PB Larsen, 'The Draft Space Protocol 
and Jurisdiction over Commercial Space Assets' in 
Corinne M Jorgenson (ed), 2011 Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law (Eleven International 
Publishing 2012) 485, 488, 490-91 (citing Aoki's 
concept of comprehensive jurisdiction as well as other 
commentators who argue that Article VIII provides an 
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the state of registry). 
At the end, Larsen concludes that there is uncertainty 
as to whether Article VIII's grant of jurisdiction is 
exclusive. Ibid 499. 
an absurd result that would render the Cape 
Town Convention a nullity since the successful 
operation of the Convention requires that a 
creditor be able to take action in any state that 
exercises actual control over the object or those 
parties that control the object. 
There are commentators who argue for 
a narrower interpretation of Article VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty. The concept of 
'jurisdiction' in Article VIII can be more 
narrowly read in at least two respects. First, even 
if Article VIII is read as granting jurisdiction 
of every form to the state of registry, it can 
be interpreted as a non-exclusive grant of 
jurisdiction - thus enabling other states to assert 
jurisdiction when appropriate under other 
sources of domestic and international law.55 
These sources would include both customary 
international law (which permits a state to 
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction if any of the 
five bases of prescriptive jurisdiction exists) 
and treaty law (which would include a grant of 
jurisdiction under the Cape Town Convention 
and Protocol). This interpretation of Article 
VIII is reasonable pursuant to a plain reading 
of its language, which does not state that the 
jurisdiction of the launching state is exclusive. 
Under this narrower reading of Article VIII, 
although State Bin the scenario described at the 
outset of this section might have jurisdiction to 
grant interim relief as the state of registry, State 
A would also have jurisdiction to grant interim 
relief under the Cape Town Convention since 
the satellite is 'situated in' State A. 
Second, Article VIII can be narrowly 
interpreted as only granting prescriptive 
55 Chatzipanagiotis (n 54) 50 (stating that '[i]t has 
been accepted that the State of registry does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction.'). Bin Cheng's writings on 
jurisdiction also support the reading of Article VIII as 
a grant of non-exclusive jurisdiction. B Cheng, 'The 
Extra-Terrestrial Application of International Law' 
(1965) 18 Current L Problems 132. Cheng explains that 
the seventh principle of the Declaration of Principles 
(the forerunner of Article VIII) merely codified 
customary international law by making clear that the 
state of registry would retain any jurisdiction over its 
spacecraft and the personnel on board that it would 
otherwise have under customary international law. Ibid 
141. 
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jurisdiction to the state of registry over a space 
object (as well as any activity taking place on 
board the object).56 This would make sense in 
the greater context of the concept that the state 
of registry 'shall retain jurisdiction and control.' 
This is a directive that the state of registry 
maintain control over the space object and 
makes clear that the laws of the state of registry 
shall apply to the object (and any activity 
taking place on board the object). The actual 
enforcement of such regulations by the state 
of registry would require that the state have 
adjudicative jurisdiction over those parties that 
control the object, which would require some 
connection of the parties to the state (or in 
rem jurisdiction over the object itself). It could 
be argued that Article VIII does not address 
adjudicative jurisdiction. 57 This interpretation of 
Article VIII would mean that there is no conflict 
between the Outer Space Treaty and the Cape 
Town Convention since the Outer Space Treaty 
addresses prescriptive jurisdiction, while the 
Cape Town Convention addresses adjudicative 
jurisdiction. In the absence of any conflict, the 
Convention's jurisdiction provisions would be 
unaffected by the existing space law. Moreover, 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty suggests 
that any grant of prescriptive jurisdiction 
under Article VIII is a non-exclusive grant of 
jurisdiction since the duty to supervise national 
activity under Article VI presupposes that a state 
have prescriptive jurisdiction over the activities 
of one's nationals (as well as the space objects 
operated by its nationals).58 
56 S Hobe et al, (n 29) 159 (stating that '[t]he 
legal consequence of jurisdiction and control is the 
applicability of the national law of the State of registry 
for the object launched into outer space.'); see also M 
Gerhard and K Gungaphul-Brocard, 'The Impact of 
National Space Legislation on Space Industry Contracts' 
in LJ Smith and I Baumann (eds), Contracting for Space: 
Contract Practice in the European Space Sector (Ashgate 
2011) 64 (explaining that the grant of jurisdiction to 
the state of registry 'defines the law applicable to space 
objects.'). 
57 See, eg, PB Larsen (n 31) 191 (asserting that the 
'Outer Space Treaty is not intended to cover the issue 
of jurisdiction of national courts.'). 
58 S Hobe et al, (n 29) 113 (stating that 'a State has 
jurisdiction over any activity that is carried on from its 
However these arguments are resolved 
in court when the time comes, good faith 
arguments can be made on either side. This 
scenario provides perhaps the most salient 
illustration of why an understanding of the 
greater body of space law is necessary for the 
practitioner working with the Space Assets 
Protocol. This understanding of the law is 
essential for both the lawyer striving to use the 
space treaties to prevent the enforcement of the 
Convention's remedies as well as for the lawyer 
who is trying to defend against such arguments. 
territory as well as over any activity that is carried on 
by its nationals.'); see also ibid 114 (explaining that state 
practice in the form of national space legislation reflects 
an understanding that the applicability of the legislation 
to space activities does not rely on the relevant object 
being registered by the state). 
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